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Abstract
Can the effects of social comparison extend beyond explicit evaluation to visual self-representation—a perceptual stimulus
that is objectively verifiable, unambiguous, and frequently updated? We morphed images of participants’ faces with
attractive and unattractive references. With access to a mirror, participants selected the morphed image they perceived as
depicting their face. Participants who engaged in upward comparison with relevant attractive targets selected a less
attractive morph compared to participants exposed to control images (Study 1). After downward comparison with relevant
unattractive targets compared to control images, participants selected a more attractive morph (Study 2). Biased
representations were not the products of cognitive accessibility of beauty constructs; comparisons did not influence
representations of strangers’ faces (Study 3). We discuss implications for vision, social comparison, and body image.
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Introduction
People frequently compare themselves to others [1,2]. For
example, people compare their salary to their co-worker’s salary
[3] and their physical fitness to that of professional athletes [4].
Much research suggests that social comparison influences self-
evaluations [5] as expressed through explicit and implicit self-
judgments [6–7]. However, the current research goes beyond to
ask if social comparison influences processes considered more
primary than explicit or implicit self-evaluation. Just as social
comparison influences cognitive self-judgments, this research asks
if social comparison similarly influences the way people come to
see themselves. This research seeks to explore whether social
comparison changes how people come to form perceptual
representations of their own faces.
To our knowledge, no research has examined the effect of social
comparison on visual self-representation, an outcome that can be
differentiated from self-judgment in a variety of ways. First, face
recognition occurs much more quickly than explicit cognitive
judgments [8–10]. Second, face perception can occur without
conscious awareness and requires few if any attentional resources
[11–15]. Much research in social judgment examines the effects of
comparison on traits that are inherently ambiguous [16]. Social
judgment is subjective because traits lack verifiability [17] and
must be constructed through processes implicating memory [18].
In contrast, face recognition is less malleable because one’s face is
a concrete and verifiable feature that most people see often. Thus,
reality constrains the malleability of visual representation [19].
Although social comparison is a potent and pervasive process, it
remains to be seen whether its effects extend to visual represen-
tation of the self—an outcome that is concrete, objectively
verifiable, and highly familiar. In sum, because visual self-
representation differs from explicit self-evaluation in multiple
ways, still open is the question of whether social comparison can
exert an influence on the recognition of one’s own face.
Understanding the consequences of social comparison on visual
self-representation is critical given that lower-level processes are
often the building blocks upon which higher-level cognition and
action are based. For example, perceived attractiveness of oneself
predicts the types of romantic partners people commit to [20]. In
addition, self-perceptions of attractiveness can lead to maladaptive
behaviors including the modification of one’s appearance through
restrictive eating behaviors [21–22] and invasive cosmetic
procedures [23]. Because higher order cognitive judgment and
behavioral choices can be the product of lower-level perceptual
processes, we examined the degree to which visual representation
of one’s own face is subject to influence by social comparison
processes.
This investigation uses as a basis for prediction research, which
suggests that people’s cognitive evaluations of their own bodies are
malleable and subject to influence by social comparison processes.
For instance, exposure to photographs of attractive, same-gender
targets led people to explicitly evaluate themselves as less attractive
[24–25]. Similarly, female adolescents expressed greater dissatis-
faction with their bodies if they exhibited more intense ‘‘celebrity
worship’’ suggesting comparison to extreme standards depicted in
the media affects evaluations of one’s body [26]. Conversely,
exposure to photographs of people who failed to meet ideal
standards of beauty led people to express less dissatisfaction with
their own bodies [27]. Explicit judgments about oneself and one’s
appearance are strongly affected by social comparison processes.
Beyond cognitive self-evaluation, preliminary evidence suggests
that visual representation of oneself appears to be flexible even
though people gain objective information about their appearance
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suggests that visual self-representation depends both on the
internal qualities of the perceiver and external constraints of the
situation. For example, implicit self-esteem predicted the attrac-
tiveness of the image participants selected as depicting their actual
likeness [29]. In addition, people were more likely to select a
photograph as the one depicting their actual likeness when that
photograph had been morphed with a trustworthy rather than
untrustworthy target [30]. Beyond internal states of the perceiver,
visual representations of the self depend on the external context.
Participants previously exposed to images of moderately over-
weight models selected a more rotund line drawing as reflecting
their appearance than participants exposed to standard models or
control stimuli [31]. Thus, converging lines of evidence suggest
that visual self-representation is malleable.
However, it is unclear what component of self-representation is
subject to influence because previous tests did not utilize a mirror
when selecting the image that depicts their likeness. Asking
participants to select an image they believe depicts themselves
without requiring participants to look at themselves or use a mirror
requires that measures of self-representation rely solely on
memory. People must recall the shape of their body or the
features of their face, for instance, in order to select the image that
reflects their likeness. While people may be motivated and in fact
believe that they are objectively selecting the correct image, they
may in fact be drawn to a positively skewed image after engaging
in a biased search through memory for other photographs that
similarly depict a more positive rendition of themselves [19,32–
33]. Classic research that tests the effects of social psychological
processes on visual representation, too, has traditionally experi-
enced difficulty in ruling out the role of memory when testing
visual phenomena [34–36].
Therefore, it still remains unclear whether situational factors
influence processes considered more basic than judgment, such as
visual representation of the self when looking into a mirror. The
current research sought to explore this possibility, and specifically
to test a novel question: can social comparison influence
representations of one’s own face? Even when looking at
themselves in a mirror, comparison standards should impact
how people view their own face. Specifically, we predicted that
comparing oneself to more attractive standards would lead people
to see their own face as less attractive whereas comparing to less
attractive standards would lead people to see their own face as
more attractive. That is, we predicted that social comparison
would produce contrast effects in visual representation of one’s
own face.
We expected that visual self-representation would be contrasted
against the comparisons available for two reasons. First, in these
studies, we presented participants with relevant comparisons that
were distinct (Studies 1–3) and extreme (Study 1). When
comparisons reflect extreme [37] and distinct information about
a specific person [38], self-evaluation is likely to be contrasted from
the standard. For instance, reading, ‘‘John is a millionaire’’ is likely
to produce a self-evaluation of, ‘‘I am poor.’’ When evaluating
one’s appearance, exposing participants to an image of a slim
rather than overweight female leads them to feel less attractive and
less satisfied with their appearance [39]. Conversely, when
comparisons reflect abstract trait information, self-evaluation is
likely to be assimilated toward the standard. For instance, the word
‘‘wealthy’’ is likely to produce a self-evaluation of, ‘‘I am wealthy.’’
When evaluating one’s appearance, activating the trait ‘‘over-
weight’’ led people to recall their own bodies as being more
overweight [31]. For this reason, we expected comparisons with
distinct upward (Study 1) and downward (Study 2) comparison
standards to produce contrast effects in visual self-representation.
In three studies, we explored the effects of social comparison on
explicit self-judgment and visual representation of one’s own face.
All studies were approved by the Internal Review Boards at Ohio
University, where the research was conducted. Study 1 tested
whether upward social comparison involving exposure to photo-
graphs of highly attractive models that were relevant (i.e. same
gender) led to more negative explicit self-evaluations of attractive-
ness and less attractive visual representation of one’s face than
exposure to irrelevant (i.e. opposite gender) comparison others.
Study 2 tested whether explicit downward social comparison with
unattractive peers influenced self-evaluations and visual self-
representation when viewing oneself with the aid of a mirror.
Finally, to refute an alternative explanation that cognitive
accessibility of appearance-related concepts influenced self-evalu-
ations and representation, Study 3 examined whether social
comparisons influenced visual representation of the face of a
stranger. We predicted that exposure to relevant social comparison
targets would influence self-evaluations of one’s own attractiveness
and visual representations of one’s own face but not evaluations or
representations of another person. We expected these effects
would occur even when looking at oneself in a mirror, thus
receiving direct visual information, and would occur independent
of implicit and explicit self-esteem.
Study 1
Study 1 tested whether exposure to upward social comparison
targets influences explicit self-evaluation and people’s representa-
tions of their own face. We exposed participants to photographs of
attractive professional models who were either relevant social
comparison targets (i.e. same gender) or irrelevant social
comparison targets (i.e. opposite gender) [24]. We predicted that
participants exposed to attractive models would explicitly evaluate
their own attractiveness less favorably and select an image of their
own face that was less attractive than participants exposed to
attractive, opposite gender models or control images.
Methods
Upon arrival to the lab, we photographed 36 participants’ (22
female) faces. Participants completed the Rosenberg Self-Esteem
scale to measure explicit self-esteem [40] and rated how much they
liked their own name to measure implicit self-esteem [41]; both
measures were included as covariates in later analyses.
Then, through a test ostensibly measuring ‘‘aesthetic judg-
ment,’’ participants randomly received one of three social
comparison manipulations. Participants assigned to the same-gender
comparison condition viewed 20 headshots of attractive professional
models of the same gender. This condition served as an upward
social comparison condition, because same-gender targets are
considered relevant comparisons. Participants assigned to the
opposite-gender control condition viewed 20 headshots of models of the
opposite gender. This condition served as a control condition, as
opposite-gender targets are irrelevant comparisons [24]. Also, this
condition served as a control to test whether exposure to faces in
and of themselves influence visual self-representations. As a
manipulation check, participants evaluated the target’s attractive-
ness on 1 (not at all)t o7( extremely) scales. Pre-testing with a separate
group of participants (n=20) showed that the same-gender and
opposite-gender photographs did not differ in attractiveness,
p..20. Finally, participants in the no comparison control condition
viewed pictures of mundane landscapes and rated how beautiful
the landscapes were on the same scales. This condition served as a
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general. After viewing and rating all 20 images, participants
provided explicit self-evaluations of their own attractiveness. Using
a1( not at all)t o7( extremely) scale, participants indicated how
attractive they felt, satisfied they felt about their appearance, and
how satisfied they felt in general (a=.89).
Then, participants completed the visual self-representation
measure, labeled for participants as the ‘‘perceptual accuracy
test.’’ We created morphed images by using an oval crop of the
participant’s original face photograph that excluded their hair and
ears [28–30]. Then, we morphed the participant’s face with 2
reference faces using Abrosoft’s Fantamorph computer program.
The attractive reference was a beautiful, artificially created
composite face that was highly symmetrical. The unattractive
reference was the face of a person suffering from a facial disorder
(i.e., craniofacial syndrome) that was highly asymmetrical. We
chose these references to replicate previously used methodologies
[29]. We created 12 morphed images that reflected 5% increment
increases of either the attractive or unattractive reference face. For
example, the +40% image was created by morphing participants’
original photograph with 40% of the attractive one, while the
220% image was created by morphing participants’ original with
20% of the unattractive photograph (see Figure 1).
Participants were presented with a total array that included 13
images presented simultaneously on a 15-inch computer monitor.
In a scattered, random order appearing across all areas of the
computer screen, participants saw their actual photograph, 8
morphs with the attractive reference (+5% to +40%), and 4 with
the unattractive reference (25% to 220%). We used this range
because previous research demonstrated that participants rarely
selected faces outside of it as their own [29]. To measure visual
self-representation, participants told the experimenter which
photograph they thought matched the image they saw when
looking into the mirror [42]. Participants were directed to use a
mirror to ensure that face selection reflected perceptual represen-
tation processes, as opposed to memory based processes exclu-
sively. All participants indicated in debriefing that they utilized the
mirror to make a selection. Furthermore, during pilot testing,
participants were covertly observed during the visual self-
representation task; all participants utilized the mirror to select a
morphed image, suggesting the instructions were likely to induce
use of the mirror in the main study.
Following these procedures, participants underwent debriefing
and probes for suspicion of the hypotheses. In all studies, no
participant identified the connection between the social compar-
ison and visual self-representation tasks.
Results
Evaluations of same-gender (a=.85, M=5.76, SD=0.87) and
opposite-gender photographs (a=.85, M=5.53, SD=0.78) were
substantially above the midpoint of the scale (ts,.001), demon-
strating that they were viewed as highly attractive targets.
Social comparison condition influenced explicit self-evaluations
regarding one’s own attractiveness, F(2, 33)=3.58, p,.05,
g
2=.18. Participants in the same-gender comparison condition reported
lower self-evaluations than participants in the opposite-gender,
t(33)=2.06, p,.05, d=0.77, and no comparison control conditions,
t(33)=2.51, p,.05, d=1.01, see Table 1.
Social comparison also influenced visual representation of one’s
own face, F(2, 33)=4.20, p,.05, g
2=.20. Participants in the same-
gender comparison condition selected a morphed face that was less
attractive than participants in the opposite-gender, t(33)=2.62,
p,.05, d=1.08, and no comparison control conditions, t(33)=2.39,
p,.05, d=1.11, see Table 1.
Although our primary hypotheses concerned the effects of social
comparison on self-evaluations and visual self-representations, we
tested for the effects of other predictor variables. We reran the
models predicting self-evaluation and visual self-representation
from social comparison condition (coded same gender=22, no
comparison control=+1, opposite gender=+1) and added par-
ticipant gender (coded female=1, male=0), implicit self-esteem,
and explicit self-esteem as predictors. The effect of social
comparison condition on explicit self-evaluation remained signif-
icant when all other predictors were simultaneously entered into
the model, b=.43, t=3.80, p=.001. Explicit self-esteem was a
significant predictor of explicit self-evaluation, b=.54, t=4.59,
p,.001, but implicit self-esteem, b=.23, t=1.93, p=.06, and
gender, b=.21, t=1.81, p=.08, did not significantly predict
explicit self-evaluation.
Further, the effect of social comparison condition on visual self-
representation also remained significant when all other predictors
were entered, b=.46, t=2.91, p=.007. Explicit self-esteem,
b=.02, t=0.12, p=.91, implicit self-esteem, b=.02, t=0.10,
p=.92, and gender, b=.16, t=1.01, p=.32, did not significantly
predict visual self-representation.
Finally, we tested whether visual self-representations were
produced as a result of changes in explicit self-ratings or whether
they were statistically independent. While there was a marginally
significant correlation between the two outcome variables (r=.32,
p=.06), a sobel test [43] showed that the effect of social
comparison (dummy coded as 22 for same-gender comparison,
and +1 for opposite-gender and no comparison control) on visual
self-representation was not mediated by explicit self-ratings,
Figure 1. Reference faces with which participants’ original photographs were morphed and selected examples of morphed images.
Morphed images were presented in a random order during the visual self-representation task; reference faces were not presented to participants.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036742.g001
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were not the result of changes in explicit self-evaluation judgments.
Study 2
While Study 1 exposed participants to upward comparison
targets that were either relevant or irrelevant, Study 2 tested
whether relevant downward social comparisons influence visual
self-representation. Additionally, although incidental exposure to
comparison targets does induce comparison processes [24–25], we
still were left to infer that the act of comparison occurred. In Study
2, we explicitly directed participants to compare their appearance
to the appearance of the provided targets to ensure that social
comparison processes were activated and produced the same
effects on evaluation and representation. Finally, although
unlikely, it is possible that in Study 1 participants differentially
responded to the social comparison conditions as a function of
their own level of attractiveness. To explore this possibility, outside
observers rated the attractiveness of each participant. We included
objective evaluations of participant’s attractiveness in the analyses
to ensure that the obtained social comparison effects are not due to
pre-existing differences in attractiveness.
Methods
We photographed 24 participants (17 female) and asked them to
complete the same implicit and explicit self-esteem scales as in
Study 1. Then, participants randomly received one of two social
comparison manipulations. Participants assigned to the lateral
comparison condition viewed 20 photographs of same-gender peers
who were moderately attractive, while participants assigned to the
downward comparison condition viewed 20 photographs of unattractive
same-gender peers. These photographs were cropped to focus
primarily on the face. The photos were taken from HotorNot.com,
a website on which each photograph had been rated by several
hundred people on a 1 (not hot)t o1 0( hot) scale. Pre-testing with a
separate group of participants (n=46) indicated that the down-
ward comparison targets were rated as less attractive than the
lateral comparison targets, p,.001.
After viewing each photograph, participants compared the
target’s attractiveness to their own by responding to the following
question: ‘‘How attractive is this person in comparison to you?’’
Comparative evaluations were made on 1 (much less attractive than
me)t o7( much more attractive than me) scales. After the comparison
task, all participants provided self-evaluations of their own
attractiveness on the same measures as Study 1 (a=.77) and
completed a visual self-representation measure while seated in
front of a mirror as was done in Study 1. During debriefing, all
participants reported using the mirror to select a morphed image.
A second group of participants (n=33) rated the attractiveness
of each participant as depicted in their original photograph using a
0( not at all attractive)t o1 0( very attractive) scale. We averaged these
ratings to obtain an objective evaluation of participant’s actual
attractiveness.
Results
Explicit comparative evaluations about the photographed
comparison other were less favorable relative to oneself in the
downward comparison condition (M=2.67, SD=0.78) than in the lateral
comparison condition (M=3.96, SD=0.39), t(22)=5.14, p,.001,
d=2.19. Evaluations of downward comparison targets were
significantly below the midpoint of the scale, which was 4,
t(11)=5.93, p,.05, yet evaluations of lateral comparison targets
did not differ from the scale midpoint, t(11)=0.33, p=.75. This
confirms that the photographs used in the downward comparison
condition depicted targets considered substantially less attractive
than participants themselves, and the photographs used in the
lateral condition equally attractive as participants themselves.
Social comparison condition influenced explicit self-evaluations
of one’s own attractiveness. Participants in the downward comparison
condition reported higher explicit self-evaluations than participants
in the lateral comparison condition, t(22)=3.21, p,.01, d=1.37, see
Table 2.
Social comparison also influenced visual representation of one’s
own face. Participants in the downward comparison condition selected a
morphed face that was more attractive than participants in the
lateral comparison condition, t(22)=2.75, p,.05, d=1.17, see Table 2.
As in Study 1, we tested for the effects of other predictor
variables. We reran the models predicting self-evaluation and
visual self-representation from social comparison condition (coded
downward comparison=1, lateral comparison=0) and added
participant gender (coded female=1, male=0), implicit self-
esteem, explicit self-esteem, and participant’s actual attractiveness
as predictors. The effect of social comparison condition on explicit
self-evaluation remained significant when all other predictors were
simultaneously entered into the model, b=.48, t=2.84, p=.01.
Explicit self-esteem was a significant predictor, b=.42, t=2.29,
p=.04, but implicit self-esteem, b=.06, t=0.35, p=.73, gender,
b=.02, t=0.09, p=.93, and participant’s actual attractiveness,
b=.17, t=0.85, p=.41, did not significantly predict explicit self-
evaluation.
Further, the effect of social comparison condition on visual self-
representation also remained significant when all other predictors
were entered, b=.41, t=2.06, p=.05. Explicit self-esteem,
b=.36, t=1.66, p=.11, implicit self-esteem, b=.21, t=1.01,
p=.33, gender, b=.11, t=0.52, p=.61, and participant’s actual
Table 1. Means (SDs) for Explicit Self-Ratings and Percent Morphed Face Selected During Visual Self-Representation for Study 1.
Same-Gender Opposite-Gender Landscape Control
Explicit Self-Ratings 4.2a (1.1) 4.9b (0.9) 5.1b (0.7)
Visual Self-Representation 20.4a (9.4) 13.8b (16.0) 12.5b (13.6)
Note: Subscripts that differ within rows indicate significance at p,.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036742.t001
Table 2. Means (SDs) for Explicit Self-Ratings and Percent
Morphed Face Selected During Visual Self-Representation for
Study 2.
Lateral Downward
Explicit Self-Ratings 4.9a (0.8) 5.8b (0.5)
Visual Self-Representation 21.3a (13.3) 11.7b (9.4)
Note: Subscripts that differ within rows indicate significance at p,.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036742.t002
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predict visual self-representation.
As in Study 1, explicit self-ratings and visual self-representations
were statistically independent. That is, although the two outcome
variables were significantly correlated (r=.50, p,.05), a sobel test
[48] showed that the effect of social comparison on visual self-
representation was not mediated by explicit self-ratings, z=1.29,
p..15.
Study 3
Study 3 addressed an alternative account for the findings
obtained in Studies 1 and 2. One could argue that exposure to
photographs of attractive and unattractive people primed or made
accessible beauty-related concepts. Study 1 provided initial
evidence that this was not the case. Beauty-related concepts
should have been equally active in both the relevant, same-gender
condition and in the irrelevant, opposite-gender condition as the
photographs were rated to be equally attractive in both conditions.
However, it is still possible that gender similarity differentially
activated beauty-related concepts, or that the cognitive structure of
facial beauty is organized according to gender.
To provide an additional test of this cognitive accessibility
alternative explanation, Study 3 examined whether social com-
parison affected the representation of others. If exposure to
unattractive people primes appearance-related concepts (e.g., ugly,
unappealing), then exposure to unattractive peers should carry
over to influence the representation of others, just as it influences
representation of oneself [44]. Alternatively, the social comparison
explanation we postulate predicts that exposure to unattractive
peers should not influence the representation of others. While
comparisons between the self and others changes self-evaluations,
they should not influence evaluations of other people. This
prediction is consistent with past work showing that social
comparison [6] and concept-priming [31] more readily influence
self-evaluation than evaluation of others.
Furthermore, rarely during social comparison do processes
carry over to third parties not referenced in the comparison [45].
Specifically, comparing one’s spouse to a highly attractive model
may affect representations of the spouse, but should not affect self-
representations. Similarly, comparing oneself to a highly attractive
model may affect representations of oneself, but not one’s spouse.
Therefore, we predicted that exposure to social comparison targets
would influence explicit self-evaluation but would not influence
visual representation of others’ faces.
Methods
We yoked 24 new observer participants to each participant we
photographed in Study 2. New observer participants were of the
same race and gender as Study 2 participants to which they were
matched, and came from the same participant pool. New observer
participants experienced a procedure parallel to that of Study 2.
Observers initially were photographed, completed measures of
implicit and explicit self-esteem, and were randomly assigned to
one of the two comparison conditions used in Study 2 in which
they explicitly rated photos (lateral comparison, downward
comparison). Immediately after the photo-rating task, observers
provided explicit self-evaluations of their own appearance using
the same measures as participants in Studies 1 and 2 (a=.84). It
was necessary to have participants evaluate themselves before they
evaluated and were exposed to the yoked target. Otherwise, the
effect of social comparison on self-evaluation may have been
contaminated by possible comparisons with the yoked target.
Then, observers were brought to an adjacent laboratory room
and seated at a computer with a 20-inch monitor. First, observers
saw an original, unaltered photograph of the participant from
Study 2 to which they were yoked. The photograph was displayed
on the right side of the computer screen and was the same size as
the mirror image Study 2 participants saw of themselves. Thus, the
image to which observers were exposed assumed the same basic
shape, size, and location as the mirror image of themselves
participants in Study 2 saw. Observers explicitly rated this person’s
appearance on the same measures Study 2 participants used to
rate themselves (a=.76).
Finally, the experimenter presented observers with the morphed
photo array of the participant from Study 2 to which they were
yoked. This array appeared on the left side of the screen, and the
unaltered original photo remained on the right side of the screen.
The size of the morphed array assumed the same size as that
presented to participants in Study 2. Observers reported which
morphed image matched the unaltered photograph they viewed
on the right side of the screen—the very same place where
participants in Study 2 looked to see their own image in a mirror.
During debriefing, all participants indicated that they used the
unaltered photograph on the right side of the screen to select a
morphed image.
Results
In the manipulation check, explicit comparative evaluations
were less favorable about the photographed comparison other
relative to oneself in the downward comparison condition (M=2.87,
SD=0.78) than in the lateral comparison condition (M=3.93,
SD=0.87), t(22)=3.16, p=.005, d=1.35. Evaluations of down-
ward comparison targets were significantly below the midpoint of
the scale, t(11)=5.05, p,.001, yet evaluations of the lateral
comparison targets did not differ from the scale midpoint,
t(11)=0.26, p=.80. This serves as a manipulation check that the
photographs served as lateral or downward social comparison
targets.
Exposure to social comparison information had a significant
influence on explicit self-evaluations. Participants in the downward
comparison condition reported more positive self-evaluations of their
own attractiveness than participants in the lateral comparison
condition, t(22)=2.29, p,.05, d=0.98, see Table 3.
We also tested for the effects of other predictor variables. We
reran the model predicting self-evaluation from social comparison
condition (coded downward comparison=1, lateral compari-
son=0) and added participant gender (coded female=1,
male=0), implicit self-esteem, and explicit self-esteem as predic-
tors. The effect of social comparison condition on explicit self-
evaluation largely remained when all other predictors were
simultaneously entered into the model, b=.32, t=1.84, p=.08.
Explicit self-esteem was a significant covariate, b=.52, t=3.12,
Table 3. Means (SDs) for Explicit Self and Other Ratings of
Attractiveness and Percent Morphed Face Selected During
Visual Target Representation for Study 3.
Lateral Downward
Explicit Self-Ratings 4.9a (0.8) 5.7b (0.7)
Explicit Other-Ratings 5.0a (1.1) 5.2a (0.4)
Visual Other-Representation 4.6a (13.9) 5.4a (17.9)
Note: Subscripts that differ within rows indicate significance at p,.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036742.t003
Social Comparison and Vision
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gender, b=.20, t=1.19, p=.25, did not significantly predict
explicit self-evaluation.
Exposure to social comparison information did not affect
explicit evaluations of the attractiveness of the yoked target,
t(22)=0.50, p=.60, d=0.21, see Table 3. Social comparison
condition also did not influence visual representations of the yoked
target’s face, t(22)=0.13, p=.90, d=0.05, see Table 3. In sum,
social comparisons did not influence explicit evaluations or visual
representation of others, suggesting the effects of social comparison
did not carry over to evaluations of others.
Further, these findings rule out the possibility that the social
comparison task was simply priming beauty-related concepts. If
attractive faces primed cognitive constructs of beauty, even those
that are organized within gender categories, activated constructs
related to beauty should impact all subsequent judgments
including self and other evaluations and visual representations of
others. These data suggest that the photographs presented during
the photo-rating task were extreme enough to impact self-
evaluations, however they did not impact evaluations or visual
representations of others. These data argue against the possibility
that cognitive accessibility of beauty constructs was responsible for
visual representations in these studies.
Discussion
Do social comparison processes affect self-representations? The
current research suggests, first, that social comparisons influence
both self-evaluations and more basic processes including visual
representation of one’s face. Relevant upward social comparison,
relative to irrelevant or no comparison, led people to evaluate
themselves less positively and to visual represent themselves when
looking into the mirror as less attractive (Study 1). Additionally,
explicit downward comparison, relative to lateral comparison, led
people to evaluate themselves more positively, and represent
themselves as more attractive (Study 2). Thus, the effect of social
comparison occurred both in situations when comparison
processes were likely to occur but were not explicitly required of
participants (Study 1) and when comparison was explicitly directed
(Study 2). Social comparison processes influenced visual represen-
tation of one’s own face even when participants had direct access
to a mirror in which they all viewed their own face (Studies 1–2).
In addition, social comparison processes influenced visual self-
representation largely independent of implicit and explicit self-
esteem (Studies 1–2) and participants’ actual level of attractiveness
(Study 2). This research suggests that visual representation of the
self may be malleable and contextually dependent upon ongoing
psychological processes.
It is unlikely that cognitive accessibility of beauty-related
constructs influenced visual self-representation. First, exposure to
attractive models did not unconditionally influence representation.
Instead representation was influenced only when participants were
exposed to attractive models that were relevant, same-gender
social comparison targets (Study 1). Second, social comparison
influenced self-evaluations (Studies 1–3) and visual representation
of one’s own face (Studies 1–2), but not visual representations of
others’ faces (Study 3). These data serve as the first demonstration
that social comparison affects earlier perceptual processes includ-
ing visual self-representation. Given that one’s likeness is
objectively verifiable, unambiguous, and people are updated on
their own appearance every time they see their reflection, that
comparison affects visual self-representation attests to the strength
and pervasiveness of comparison processes.
Self-Awareness and Visual Self-Representation
Critical to our design, participants provided measures of visual
self-representation while seated in front of a mirror. Use of a
mirror fundamentally transforms the self-representation task from
one that relies solely on memory, to one that captures a
combination of memory and perceptual-based processes. While
the mirror creates visual, perceptual input, it can also increase self-
awareness. Self-awareness is a psychological state in which people
automatically compare themselves to internal standards and ideals,
which can be unpleasant given that people often fail to match their
ideals [46]. For example, looking into a mirror can draw attention
to the blemishes on one’s face. While the presence of mirrors can
increase self-awareness, self-awareness is likely not confounded
with social comparison processes in our studies. Since all
participants regardless of comparison condition viewed themselves
in front of a mirror, levels of self-awareness were equal across
conditions. While self-awareness might be heightened in our
studies compared to situations when mirrors are not present, self-
awareness cannot be responsible for producing the differences in
evaluation and representation we found among comparison
conditions. However, future research could benefit by exploring
the interactive effects of social comparison processes and self-
awareness on visual self-representation.
Accuracy in Self-Representation
It is possible that the static or moving nature of the target face
impacted accuracy during the visual perception task. Participants
in Study 3 viewed a static image of the target, while participants in
Studies 1 and 2 viewed their image in a mirror. It is possible that
static images made the face-matching task easier given the simpler
perceptual input. However, this seems not to be the case. After
exposure to lateral comparisons, participants in Study 2 selected
an image of themselves that deviated 21.3% from their actual
image while participants in Study 3 selected an image of others
that deviated 4.6%. Given that participants were not more
accurate when viewing static images of others compared to when
viewing more complex moving images of themselves, it does not
seem to be the case that decreased ease of perceptual processing
contributes to the effects of social comparison on self-representa-
tion.
Further, across conditions, it may appear that participants’
representations were generally inaccurate when choosing an image
that depicted their actual likeness. Participants selected a morphed
face that was somewhat more attractive than their actual image
(Study 1: M=8.61, one-sample t=3.58, p=.001; Study 2:
M=5.21, one-sample t=1.95, p=.06). One could interpret this
data as indicating that people represent themselves in an overly
favorable manner. During the face-selection process, however, we
presented participants with more images of their face morphed
with the attractive reference than images morphed with the
unattractive reference. The range we chose reflected the range
that participants actually used in previous research that employed
the same dependent measure [29]. As a result, participants’ odds
of selecting a morphed image that was more attractive, as opposed
to less attractive than their actual image, was greater just by mere
chance. For this reason, the reported findings cannot be
interpreted with respect to what constitutes an accurate selection,
but instead differences can only be discussed with reference to
relationships among manipulated conditions.
Distinctiveness and Face Adaptation
Some readers may wonder about the effects of some aspects of
our experimental paradigm, including distinctiveness of the
comparison faces and exposure to other faces in general, on
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the line up of morphed images of participants’ own faces called
upon attractive and unattractive references that were selected
because they differed in facial symmetry, which is a key
component of attractiveness [47]. It is possible that the reference
faces differed on other factors including distinctiveness. For
example, one could argue that the appearance of the target
suffering from cranio-facial syndrome may be more distinct than
that of the aggregated, highly attractive target. However, this
possibility seems unlikely in light of past work showing that highly
symmetrical faces are distinct and rare in the natural world [48–
49]; most people to which others are exposed lack symmetry.
Because symmetrical faces, like those used as our referent, are
uncommon and unique outside artificial lab paradigms, symmet-
rical faces are distinct.
While we espoused that exposure to attractive and unattractive
faces produces high level (i.e., cognitive) social comparison
processes, other research suggests that exposure to attractive and
unattractive faces leads to lower level face adaptation effects.
According to face adaptation theories [50], exposure to relatively
extreme faces shifts the perceived ‘‘average’’ level of attractiveness,
which is used as a standard during representation of subsequent
targets [51–52]. Thus, exposure to extreme faces produces
perceptual contrast effects. Rather than competing processes, we
believe that face adaptation effects are related to social comparison
effects. Initial exposure to attractive and unattractive targets
changes the standards that are available at low levels of processing
when subsequently perceiving targets and making higher level
assessments of representation. Thus face adaptation effects may
contribute to social comparison phenomenon by shifting the
standards that are available and which are used; psychometric
functions might be employed to test this possibility in the future as
we were not explicitly testing this perceptual mechanism.
Although exposure may shift low level perceptual standards as
suggested by face adaptation theories, it is possible to dissociate the
effects of social comparison theories and face adaptation theories.
First, face adaptation theories suggest muted although still present
contrast effects when there is a mismatch between the gender of
the faces presented during preliminary exposure and the gender of
the target faces [53]. That is, face adaptation theories might
predict an effect of exposure to opposite-gender photographs on
self-representation. On the other hand, social comparison theories
might predict that opposite-gender faces presented during
preliminary exposure should be considered irrelevant targets.
Thus, social comparison theories predict no effect of exposure to
opposite-gender faces on visual self-representation. As suggested
by social comparison theories, self-representation was unaffected
by exposure to opposite-gender photographs in Study 1.
Second, face adaptation theories suggest that contrast effects
should be largest when targets are unfamiliar others [54–56]
compared to when the target is the self [57; but see 58]. However,
social comparison theories suggest contrast effects should be larger
when the target is the self compared to others. As supported by
social comparison theories, exposure to unattractive others
influence self-representation (Study 2) but did not influence
representations of others (Study 3). Thus, it is possible that
exposure to extreme faces shifts available low level standards
which may be used, to varying degrees, during higher level social
comparison processes particularly when those shifted standards are
considered relevant. Further, these shifted standards may be
considered relevant when forming representations of the self.
While we are simply speculating on the relative influence of these
two effects, future research could systematically disentangle the
power of each to influence visual self-representation.
Limitations and Future Directions
The present studies had a few limitations, which point the way
for future research. First, Studies 1 and 2 had more female than
male participants (65% female across studies) and relatively small
sample sizes (60 participants across studies). Future research might
balance participant gender and increase sample sizes to better test
gender differences in response to social comparison during visual
self-representation. While past research indicates that self-evalu-
ative reactions to comparison others are generally comparable
among men and women [5], it is possible that visual self-
representation effects may be moderated by gender, given gender
differences in issues related to body image. For instance, only an
estimated 5 to 15 percent of people with anorexia or bulimia are
male [59]. Gender differences may emerge if the ability to detect
what might be smaller effects in men increased.
Another limitation in our paradigm was the fact that we
presented participants with an unbalanced array of faces during
visual self-representation measure. That is, we presented partic-
ipants with more images of their face morphed with the attractive
reference than images of their face morphed with the unattractive
reference. Such unequal distributions offer participants greater
visual experience with attractive images compared to unattractive
images. We held this feature of the visual self-representation
measure constant across social comparison conditions; therefore,
unequal exposure cannot fully explain the effects of comparison
conditions. Nonetheless, future research is needed to further
explore whether our pattern of results would replicate using a
balanced outcome where participants are presented with an equal
number of attractive and unattractive references.
Finally, although it is unlikely that the present studies can be
fully accounted for by a face adaptation explanation, additional
research is needed to further explore whether exposure to
attractive and unattractive targets influences self-representation
as a function of social comparison processes, face-adaptation, or
both. The results of Study 3, whereby exposure to unattractive
targets did not affect representation of others, suggest that our
results were likely driven by comparison and not adaptation.
However, methodical limitations of Study 3, such as the use of a
static image rather than a mirror image during target-perception,
suggest that more work is needed to definitively rule out face
adaptation as a contributing mechanism.
Conclusion
It is important to investigate the scope of social comparison
influences. By noting that comparison can exert an influence on
early forms of information processing, including representation of
one’s own face, we take one step toward explaining why social
comparison can be so deleterious, impacting even general levels of
mental and physical health [60–61]. People may not be aware that
social comparison processes are shaping the contents of their self-
evaluations, and thus may lack the awareness or ability to control
the effects of comparison [4]. If comparison goes unabated, as it
might when comparison exerts an influence early on in
information processing, then it is ever more possible that
comparison can impact not just how people interpret and think
about their social world but how they literally see it.
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